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Abstract
Prison space is always scarce in an economic sense. However,
historically, institutional arrangements for allocating this resource
have failed to reflect this scarcity in a systematic and rational
manner. Hence, prison capacity 'crises' such as currently being
experienced in Illinois and other states are an inevitable conse-
quence of this institutional failure. A long-run procedure for allo-
cating public resources to prison space is proposed. This procedure
will continuously inform the state government as to whether the
existing prison space is adequate in an economic sense—willingness
of taxpayers to pay the costs—and it will also allocate the existing
space among counties in an equitable manner. Specifically, it is
proposed that property rights to the available prison space be allo-
cated, without costs, to the 102 county governments. The Department
of Corrections would then periodically administer a 'market' within
which county governments could exchange these property rights with
each other at a market determined cash price. Counties whose citizens
preferred to rely heavily upon long-term prison sentences for local
crime control would be net buyers of space from counties whose
citizens were willing to rely more upon other sanctions for their
crime control. The resulting market clearing price for the services
of a prison cell, when compared to real construction costs, provides
a clear indication to state government as to the need or lack of need
for additional prison space. A price higher than construction costs
signals the need for new prison construction, a price lower than
construction costs indicates the available total space is adequate (or
excessive). Rights to any new space would be allocated to counties on
the same basis as the original allocation.
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Allocating Resources to Prison Space: An Economic Approach
Incorporating Efficiency and Equity
Introduction
The current prison capacity crisis in Illinois and other states
offers an opportunity to adopt a long-run policy which recognizes that
prison space is a scarce resource and which allocates the resource in a
manner which both reflects its true economic cost to the taxpayers of
the state and which provides each county an equitable share of this
state resource for local crime control.
It should be recognized at the start that prison space has always
been scarce in the true economic sense of placing a claim on the
limited real resources of society. Further, it has nearly always has
been rationed by one or another institutional method. The current
'crisis' in Illinois differs only in degree and because it has been
drawn to the public's attention by a successful legal challenge to the
most recent rationing method— the Illinois Department of Corrections'
(IDOC) early release policy.
The solution to be proposed takes as given most of the explicit
and implicit institutional arrangements regarding the division of
responsibility for crime control between the state and local govern-
ments, particularly county governments. Under these arrangements the
state government's role is one of setting general standards of opera-
tion and providing a necessary common legal framework. In addition
the State has accepted some limited fiscal responsibilities in the
form of salary subsidies for selected county criminal justice person-
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nel and, most important, all of the costs of operating the state
prison system.
However, nearly all of the policing, prosecuting, and adjudicating
functions are under the direct control of county and city governments
and thus local citizens. For example, the sheriff and states attorney
are elected county officials. Circuit judges, although nominally
elected within circuits, generally conduct court only in their 'home'
counties and it is the voters in their home counties to whom they
must look for retention. Further, a large portion of the resources
needed to support these local services is raised by county taxes and
managed by county executives or county boards whose taxing and expen-
diture decisions are directly accountable to the citizens of the
county. Thus, to a very large degree marginal crime control policy
decisions and marginal funding decisions are a local matter. To the
extent that criminals and their victims are both residents of the same
locality (county) this arrangement has a political rationale, that is,
the more local the nature of a problem, the more our political system
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tends to favor locally designed solutions.
The state support for long-term incarceration— the state prison
system—differs in an important degree from state support for local
salaries in that the state does not explicitly allocate prison resources
among the counties. Rather, the state provides these services on
a first-come-first-serve basis. Because prison space is always finite
and fixed in the short-run, this passive response of the state to
local sentencing decisions can lead (one could argue, will inevitably
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lead) Co a prison capacity crisis such as we are currently
experiencing.
An Economic Solution
Since incarceration services
—
prison space—will never be 'free',
efficient allocation requires that it be supplied in an amount which
will equate the 'price' consumers are willing to pay for the last unit
with the cost of supplying the last unit. Computing the economic
costs of supplying the service, e.g., construction costs and operating
costs, is a straightforward exercise in cost accounting. The dif-
ficulty in applying this rule to prison space arises in determining
the value of the last unit to 'consumers*. In this case the consumers
are the citizens (also voters, potential crime victims, and taxpayers)
of each county expressing their wishes through their elected
officials—county prosecutor, judges, and county boards. We propose
that the value to county consumers be determined, as are private
goods, by a 'market'.
Each county would initially be allocated, without cost, a share of
available prison capacity; how this share is to be determined we
return to later. County officials would then be free to buy or sell
prison space with other counties. Counties which wished to rely
heavily upon prison incarceration as a means of crime control, i.e.,
to an extent greater than the space allocated to them, would have to
purchase additional space from other counties, counties which were
willing to utilize more heavily alternatives to prison incarceration.
The actual 'market' might be administered by the Department of
Corrections. For example, every month or quarter an auction would be
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run by the DOC where a market clearing price was determined and space
rights and cash exchanged. The DOC would also be charged with main-
taining the official records regarding ownership of the property
rights.
The market clearing price from the auctions would provide the
state government with a very valuable bit of information. The price
would reflect the common dollar value attached to one additional unit
of prison space by every county in the state. For example, consider a
county which neither purchased or sold space at the auction where the
clearing price was $15,000 per cell. One can infer that this county
did not purchase additional space at the final price because the value
placed on additional space by the county was less than $15,000.
Likewise, if the county had unused space but did not sell, one can
infer that the county valued the loss of one cell of its own space
equal to or more than the $15,000 it could have produced. Combining
these two inferences , we conclude that the value placed on one
additional cell, even by counties which did not transact, was
approximately equal to the final price, $15,000. And certainly for
counties which did transact, one would infer that they stopped trans-
acting only when the value to them of one additional cell or one less
cell was also approximately $15,000.
The state now has a measure of the common dollar value placed upon
additional prison space by every county . If this value exceeds the
construction and operating costs of an additional cell, then this is a
clear signal to state government that additional space is needed in a
very meaningful sense, i.e., county (and state) taxpayers are willing
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to pay more for additional space than it costs. Conversely, if the
auction price is less than the costs of constructing an additional
cell, the stock of space is adequate (or excessive) in a true economic
sense.
Let us now consider how the initial stock of prison space might be
allocated to the counties prior to the start of the periodic auctions.
The method of allocation can be based either on (i) principles of
equity among counties or (ii) on efficiency, e.g., allocating the
state's prison space so as to achieve the greatest total reduction in
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state crime regardless of where the reduction occurs among counties.
We will consider only allocations based upon equity for two
reasons. First, to implement the efficiency criterion we would have
to know the quantitative marginal impact of increased incarceration on
crimes punishable by incarceration in each county. That is, we would
have to have reliable quantitative estimates of the specific and
general deterrence effects of incarceration. The deterrence question
has been the subject of considerable scientific study during the last
decade or so; however, this research effort notwithstanding, we still
lack knowledge sufficiently precise for detailed marginal policy
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decisions. A second reason for considering only equity as a basis
for the administrative allocation is the problem raised by retribution
or 'justice' when used as a sentencing rationale. Even if the
deterrence issue were satisfactorily resolved, it must be recognized
that deterrence (crime control) is not the only basis for sentencing.
Certainly a desire to 'make the punishment fit the crime' may also be
very important. Just as the deterrent effect of incarceration may
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differ among counties, the local mores (tastes) regarding what is a
just sentence for identical crimes may also differ. At present there
is no way to measure these tastes a priori ; consequently, the proposal
lets the 'market' reveal such differences.
The simplest approach would be to allocate space according to
county populations, that is, every county would initially receive an
identical per capita share of existing prison space. An alternative
principle would recognize that the 'need' for prison space may not be
proportional to county population; hence, an equal per capita formula
may be challenged. (By analogy, state aid to education is not allo-
cated by gross population, but rather by need, i.e., the population of
school age children.) Thus, one could argue that prison space should
be allocated according to the number of active criminals in each
county. This, of course, is not known, but a good substitute would
be the total number of convictions for violent crimes or felonies in
each county, averaged over, say, the most recent 3 to 5 years.
Available prison space would then be allocated in proportion to this
total in each county.
Advantages of the Economic solution ;
The most important advantage is the information the auctions would
provide to state government regarding the economic need for additional
prison space—need measured by willingness to pay. Also, because
prison space is no longer 'free' to counties they would have an
incentive to consider carefully alternatives such as fines, probation,
sentences short enough to be served in the county jail, or simply
shorter prison sentences. If they use less than their allocation
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there is a direct financial benefit by selling their excess space.
Under the existing institutional arrangements the incentive to use
alternatives to prison incarceration is very weak because incar-
ceration in state prisons appears to be free to the local decision
makers—county boards, prosecutors and judges. In contrast, use of
alternatives to prison incarceration frequently increases the finan-
cial burden on the county budget. In short, this approach permits
each county's citizens to select any mix of sanctions that they are
willing to pay for.
Two recent studies have reviewed the efforts to introduce alter-
natives to incarceration as a means of reducing prison populations.
These studies both conclude that whatever other benefits the introduc-
tions of alternatives might have achieved, a significant reduction in
prison populations was not one of them.
"The foregoing review of the research literature on alter-
natives to incarceration suggests that their promise remains
largely unmet. In each instance, the nonincarcerative options
were transformed, serving criminal justice system values and goals
other than reducing imprisonment. Sentencing alternatives, such as
restitution and community service, are employed to enhance the
increasingly criticised sanctions of probation and fines. There
is little evidence that sentencing alternatives have substantially
displaced incarceration. "->
A similar pessimistic conclusion was reached regarding of the use
of community correction programs.
"To summarize, there is no evidence that the widespread adop-
tion of community programs has reduced crime rates or the use of
correctional institutions. Nor is it the case that community
programs, by lowering recidivism rates, help to reduce pressure
on the correctional system to expand.""
One reason for the failure of sentencing alternatives to affect
prison populations may well be the lack of incentives in the form of
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local economic costs facing local authorities who impose the sentences
and who are accountable to the local population.
Objections to the economic solution
There are bound to be different concepts of what is an 'equitable'
initial distribution of prison space to counties. However, allocating
state resources among different groups is a type of issue with which
state legislatures deal every day. There is no reason to believe that
they will be unable to do a politically less acceptable job in this
case than in the other allocation decisions they make. Further, the
initial allocation decision is most important when prison space is
subsequently revealed to be scarce in an economic sense, that is, when
the initial auction prices are higher than the cost of additional
space. In this case, more space should be constructed. The alloca-
tion of this additional space can be modified to correct any inequity
that has been revealed by experience.
For several reasons, it would also be desirable to make an initial
direct allocation of space to the Department of Corrections as well as
to the counties. This space could be used during the transition
period to assist counties with large fiscal burdens to adapt to the
system by 'lending' space. The IDOC space could also be used as a
buffer whenever new space was under construction. Finally, to the
extent that certain crimes—class X in Illinois—have a mandatory
prison sentence, counties would have no choice regarding the use of
alternatives to incarceration. Therefore, it might be desirable for
prison space used by such convictions to be charged to the IDOC
allocation.
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Certainly many prosecutors and judges will argue that this solu-
tion imposes an unwarranted constraint on their sentencing responsi-
bilities. Such a complaint fails to recognize that prison space is
not a free resource; hence, it must always be subject to rationing by
some method. The legally invalidated early release program of the IDOC
was one such rationing method. It was objected to because it amounted
to IDOC interference with local sentencing decisions—interference
which lacked statutory authority. When indeterminant sentencing was
in use, there is reason to believe that the rate of parole was
influenced, in part, by institutional capacity. The scarcity of
prison space makes interference with some sentences inevitable.
However, the proposed solution introduces interference which is less
objectionable because it is subject to local control, i.e., county
sentencing decisions will only be limited by what county taxpayers
will fund.
It should be emphasized that the proposed economic solution is
superior to an early release program, even if one can be found that
meets the objections of judges and prosecutors. An early release
program 'corrects' selected initial sentences to make prison capaci-
ties consistent with the current demand for prison space. It does
not, however, permit counties which are willing to pay the cost of
carrying out the initial sentences to do so. Further, the degree of
scarcity is never converted into a dollar value; consequently, the
need for early release only reveals that prison space is 'scarce' when
it is available to counties at a zero price. In contrast, auction
prices provide a true measure of the degree of scarcity, information
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of value to both the state government for planning purposes and to
judges and prosecutors when they are making their original sentencing
decisions.
Concluding Comments
This proposal should be judged on its merits but also upon its
merits compared to specific alternative processes for determining
optimal prison capacity. The public decision regarding prison
capacity and construction has correctly been called the tip of a
policy iceberg.
Beneath this tip is the
"...familiar but sterile ideological debate about crime and
punishment... refocused into a searching debate over the funda-
mental purposes of incarceration. Does America, and should it, put
people in prison in order to rehabilitate them and reintegrate
them into society: Or should incarceration be solely a punishment
for misdeeds, as... Or is prison merely a device to protect
society by incapacitating the offender? Indeed, is incarceration
intended for the offender at all, or is its principal purpose to
deter others from committing similar crimes?"
The debate is sterile because the protagonists have so polarized
the issues in the debate and the apparent choices. Most citizens would
recoil from the lock-them-up-and-throw-away-the-key alternative when
clearly faced with all of its implications in terms of tax costs
and/or increasingly inhumane prison conditions. Similarly, after
observing the daily parade of violent crimes provided by the media, a
moratorium on prison construction must seem to most citizens like a
crime control policy that starts with body politic shooting itself in
the foot.
Not only have these polar extremes monopolized the debate, but
spokesmen for each have been unwilling, for tactical reasons, to
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discuss alternatives. To extend the metaphor developed by Sherman and
Hawkins, it would be as if the debate regarding national security
policy in a nuclear age offered the public only two policy choices
—
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unilateral nuclear freeze or a preemptive nuclear strike.
The proposal presented here does not espouse or reject either of
these polar positions. Rather it seeks to present to the public at
the local level, where detailed sentencing choices are made, all of
the legal alternatives and the economic costs associated with each .
This is not to conclude, however, that only economic costs and moral
values are relevant for sentencing. Scientific evidence on the
marginal deterrent and rehabilitative effects of incarceration as well
as alternative sanctions is also important. The search for reliable
estimates of these effects should certainly continue and the results
introduced into the sentencing policy as they emerge.
We submit that the decision process advocated here for determining
prison capacity needs, while not perfect, is perfectible as knowledge
and experience accumulate and it provides a better alternative than
episodic crisis cures shaped primarily by the heat of ideological
rhetoric.
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Footnotes
This policy would be more accurately described as a "capacity
release" policy. Prison capacity limits was the explicit motive not a
desire to reward the inmates who were released early as a consequence
of the capacity limits.
2
The logic of the proposed solution depends crucially upon every
official involved in local sentencing decisions being locally elected,
i.e., being politically accountable to local citizens
—
potential crime
victims as well as taxpayers. This accountability would be con-
siderably weakened if judges were appointed for life, as are federal
judges.
3
The first formulation of these issues was by Carl Shoup
"Standards for the Distribution of a Free Public Service," Public
Finance/Finances Publiques , Vol. 19, No. 4 (1964).
4
These issues and research findings are reviewed in detail in
Blumstein, Alfred, Jacqueline Cohen and Daniel Nagin (eds) Deterrence
and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on
Crime Rates
,
National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 1978.
Austin, James and Barry Krisberg, "The Unmet Promise of
Alternatives to Incarceration," Crime & Delinquency , 28:3 (July 1982),
pp. 374-409.
Hylton, John H. , "Rhetoric and Reality: A Critical Appraisal of
Community Correctional Programs," Crime & Delinquency
,
28:3 (July
1982), pp. 341-373.
It could be argued that charging all of the space to DOC for such
'mandatory' incarceration convictions would invite prosecutors to use
their discretion to always set the charges for borderline crimes in the
mandatory sentencing categories. This fear could be met by charging
only some fraction of the space used for these mandatory incarceration
convictions to counties and the remaining fraction IDOC.
Q
Sherman, Michael and Gordon Hawkins, Imprisonment in America:
Choosing the Future
,
University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 6.
9
Ibid. p. 127.
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